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Abstract 
Banking union project rising from the sovereign debt crisis of the Eurozone is meant to achieve two goals simultaneously: 
completion of the single market in financial services, namely the free movement of capital and strengthening of economic and 
monetary union, especially of the single currency role, aiming at further economic integration and for paving the way to its last 
stage: full economic union and federal political union. This project that has to be doubled by the fiscal union is more advanced on 
banking supervision component, where the European Central Bank (ECB) and the European Banking Authority (EBA), involved 
also in bank assessments and stress tests, play a key role and less advanced on components of bank resolution and common 
deposit guarantee, the last two involving the creation of common European funds and institutional structures for their proper 
management. The project will likely to be completed in few years and represents a significant contribution to the reform of EU 
economic governance which started in 2010, and it was initiated by the European Commission experts together with other experts 
(see Larosière and Liikanen reports), and it has already resulted in the coordination and the political will displayed by the 
European Council to carry out the objectives, in the actions undertaken by the legislators (ECOFIN and European Parliament) by 
adopting regulations and analyzing the proposed directives and in the intense activity carried out by the European Commission, 
ECB and EBA. The urgency of completing banking union established by the European Council and the commitments made by 
other European institutions can contribute to a substantial progress until the new European elections (May 2014). Later on it may 
be taken into account a treaty change, specifically requested by United Kindgom, to clarify certain political and organizational 
aspects, including also those of fiscal union and political union. 
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
Selection and peer-review under responsibility of the Organizing Committee of ESPERA 2013. 
* Corresponding author. Tel.: 400723.181.072. 
E-mail address:petreprisecaru@yahoo.com 
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
Selection and peer-review under responsibility of the Organizing Committee of ESPERA 2013
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
583 Petre Prisecaru /  Procedia Economics and Finance  8 ( 2014 )  582 – 589 
Keywords:banking union; mechanis; supervision; resolution; deposit guarantee; fund; financial stability 
1. Introduction 
Article aims to highlight the causes, objectives, components and tools for achieving banking union, a complex 
and difficult process, but imperative in the light of requirements for further financial integration of the EU and 
related to the elimination or mitigation of vicious circles and systemic risks, to the improvement of Community, 
national and corporate governance. The correlated approach of the three basic components of banking union and 
using some legal, institutional, financial and political instruments may provide the success of this project in 
relatively short while, since the requirements of economic recovery and reducing of public deficits and debts require 
a new strategic vision of regulatory policies and of European and national decision makers in Europe. 
 
1. Defining European banking union 
Banking Union is a process of deepening financial integration in the EU, perfect connected to the completing of 
economic and monetary union (EMU), a process urged by financial crisis effects, which were turned into a massive 
bail-out of commercial banks from EU with public money, that led to an explosion of public debts in the Euro Area 
and created serious financial difficulties for many Member States, producing the so-called sovereign debt crisis in 
the Eurozone. Difficulties experienced by banks during the crisis and then have revealed the requirement of 
financial stability and improving European economic governance, including by way of creating a banking union and 
then a fiscal union (see figure no.1). The sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone and the great difficulties faced by the 
banks in Ireland, Spain, Greece, Cyprus mainly caused by financing the real estate sector and secondary by risky 
derivative operations and the purchase of government securities not only revealed major shortcomings of 
corporative governance in the banking sector but showed that financial stability can not be achieved at national level 
because of the vicious circle created between banks and governments (shocks transmitted from the government to 
the banking sector and from banks to the governments) and hence its need to break it through creating banking 
union. However as the first tool to enhance financial balance of banks and eliminate the financial burden for 
governments was thought European Stability Mechanism, which was going to ensure direct capitalization of banks 
in trouble. Should not forget that banks have a major role in the European financial system providing about ¾ of all 
credit used in the EU (their assets being about 3 times higher than the GDP of EU) and thus having a 
critical/decisive role in the proper functioning of EU economies.Therefore almost € 4,500 billion of European 
taxpayers money were used to bail out EU banks from a potential bankruptcy caused by financial crisis. In the 
graphic no.1 it is presented the situation of the banking sector in EU Member States in the light of liabilities 
structure at the level of 2013 (second quarter). 
Similar to the monetary union setting up, Germany was the promoter of banking union as a preliminary condition 
for the possibility of the European Stability Mechanism to directly capitalize the distressed banks, as in the event 
that a large bank may collapse the systemic risk would be high and could lead to a new financial crash, public 
finances being unable to save or bail out banking sector again, with instant and severe effects on the economic and  
financial  situation of the countries involved. Indeed national surveillance  authorities could ignore the fact that 
banks adjust balance sheets, especially the dubious claims, and this due to the fear of the generalized 
insolvency. There are the negative examples of the U.S. and Japan, in the first case the lax supervision and the 
deregulation led to the explosion of mortgage loans and related derivatives, with the inherent consequence of 
financial crisis, in the second case banks overburdened by bad mortgages could no longer finance productive sector 
and country crossed through two decades of economic deadness. 
Banking Union was defined as based on four pillars: a single regulatory framework for financial institutions, a 
Single Surveillance Mechanism (SSM), a harmonized system of deposit guarantee schemes, a Single Resolution 
Mechanism, the last three being essential components of the union. Establishing banking union involved  an  intense  
activity  of  consultation and debates, after the decision of the European Council in June 
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Source: Made by the author after some sources 
Fig.1. Reformed framework of economic governance in EU 
 
 
 
 
Source: European Central Bank, 2013 
Graph.1- Liabilities structure of banking sector in  2013 (second quarter) 
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Commission Communication”A Roadmap towards a Banking Union” of 12 September 2012, showing that single 
market and banking union reinforce each other and there are three major areas of interest: a) stronger prudential 
requirements suggested for the banks, regarding capital requirements (CRD4) by the new global standards on bank 
capital and liquidity; b) coverage degree of national schemes for deposit guarantee (ceiling €100,000); c) recovery 
and resolution tools for banks in crisis, meant to strengthen the European banking sector and avoid spillover 
effects. On 2 October 2012 it was published  Liikanen Report, worked out by high-level experts, at the request and 
under the auspices of the European Commission, which recommended actions in five areas: i) mandatory separation 
of high risk financial activities to those consisting of deposit filing and preserving; ii) additional separation of 
activities, conditional on a recovery and resolution plan; iii) amendments to use bail out instruments as a resolution 
manner; iv) tightening of capital requirements on traded assets and mortgage loans; v) strengthening of banks 
governance and control, including measures restricting or conditioning the managers bonuses. Liikanen Report 
reviewed the structure and evolution of the banking sector, it has proposed the improvement of regulations on risk 
management under Basel III rules, on corporative governance, on banking resolution mechanisms, on management 
and supervision strengthening,  on compensation rules for banking staff. 
 The building of institutional framework for banking supervision began in January 2011 when there were created 
European Banking Authority (EBA), the first one based on Regulation no.1093/2010 and the European Systemic 
Risk Board (ESRB), the last one in charge with macroprudential surveillance under Regulation no. 1092/2010 and 
with the involvement of European Central Bank. European Banking Authority (EBA) has only some limited powers 
to issue standards and recommendations, based on European regulations and directives and banking supervision has 
remained more the responsibility of national authorities, with or without the involvement of national central 
banks. European System of Financial Supervision consists of the European Systemic Risk Board in charge with  
macroprudential supervision and dealing in particular with monitoring and preventing the systemic risk at Union 
level and issuing of warnings and recommendations, as well as 3 European authorities (banking, insurance and 
pensions, capital markets), the European Central Bank, national supervisory authorities (banking, insurance, capital 
markets) in charge mainly with microprudential supervision, but also with some macroprudential functions. Besides 
creating the framework for macroprudential and microprudential supervision, the achievement of banking union was 
preceded by some measures and analysis or assessment phases of the European banking sector, undertaken by the 
European Commission, such as stress tests performed by  the Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS) 
from 2009, when the first test was done, followed by the second in July 2010 and the third in July 2011, here acting 
together with the European Banking Authority. The tests are intended to assess the resilience of financial institutions 
to adverse market developments, as well as an overall assessment of systemic risk in the banking system of the 
EU. Tests are performed  based on methodologies, scenarios and key assumptions developed by EBA, the ESRB, 
the ECB and the European Commission. The results of the third test were published on 15 July 2011 and they 
showed that a number of eight banks out of a total of 90 failed the stress test, of which five in Spain, two in Greece 
and one in Austria. Subsequently EBA has postponed the stress tests until 2014 to allow the ECB to control the 
situation and the quality of bank assets and to dispel the fears related to the deterioration of macroeconomic 
conditions after the financial crisis. 
  
2. Concrete achievements of the European institutions towards banking union formation 
The European Council has exercised a coordination, guidance and control activity of the process establishing the 
banking union, which has been debated over the past five quarterly summits on the section devoted to Economic and 
Monetary Union. The President of European Council has discussed together with the presidents of other institutions 
involved in the project, especially the President of European Commission, the President of the Eurogroup and the 
President of the ECB, the main aspects of setting up the banking union. At the beginning the debates focused on the 
Single Supervision Mechanism, and the powers of the ECB (Council placing supervision activity in ECB’s mission) 
and the powers of EBA, then on the single banking resolution mechanism and the deposit guarantee 
schemes. European Council set the timetable for measures to accomplish the banking union, including a final term 
to realize it. 
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The main EU legislative bodies - EU Council (ECOFIN) and the European Parliament (EP)- had a fruitful 
activity: the first one has adopted a Regulation for the Single Supervision Mechanism and a new Regulation 
amending the old Regulation establishing European Banking Authority (EBA) and in June 2013 communicated its 
position on the draft directive establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and 
investment firms, European resolution and deposit guarantee funds are going to be covered with the contributions 
made by credit institutions, while the second one has voted in September 2013 the establisment of a supervisory 
banking authority of Euro area placed under the auspices of the ECB, whose activities will be periodically examined 
by EP, and is going to engage in the adoption of directives on bank resolution and deposit guarantee in EU proposed 
by European Commission and approved by the ECOFIN. 
The European Commission took the initiative of analyses related to banking union and had the important 
legislative initiative at all levels of its buiding.  European Commission is the connecting link between all EU and 
national institutions involved in the process, her expertise having a substantial contribution to the European Council 
decision making and also for supporting the adoption of secondary legislation. The Commission works closely with 
the ECB and EBA on many technical aspects of achieving banking union. In July 2013 the European Commission 
proposed the Single Resolution Mechanism (SSM) and state aid rules for the banks in crisis. 
European Central Bank established within it a Supervision Board, separately from monetary policy tasks, and 
will be involved in evaluating the participating banks in SSM through audits and  stress tests. Supervision Board  
will have in view around 150 banks in the Eurozone, which (each) have total assets over 30 billion €, have a balance 
sheet over 20% of a member state’s Gross National Income, are among the three most important credit institutions 
in that country, receive direct support from European Stability Mechanism (Dorothea Schäfer, 2013). European 
Banking Authority  stands in terms of technical support the ECB activities in line with supervision, testing the 
resilience, mediation and establishing technical standards. 
 In conclusion it can be said that there have been made rapid progresses towards banking union constitution on 
behalf of European institutions that have effectively collaborated and almost without any flaws for adopting the 
secondary legislation required to materialize the three components of the union: surveillance, resolution and deposit 
guarantee. Establishment  of two  European funds -resolution and deposit guarantee -will still be difficult because of 
severe financial constraints and large losses recorded by banks during the financial and economic crisis. It will 
probably take at least three years to complete the project, but the urgency of completing banking union recently 
established by the European Council and the commitments of other EU institutions may contribute to a substantial 
progress until the new European elections (May 2014). Afterwards one may have in view a change of the EU 
Treaties, expressly requested by United Kindgom, clarifying the political and organizational aspects, including those 
related to fiscal union and political union. 
 
3. Expert opinions on achieving the financial stability and banking union 
Mugur Isărescu (2013), The Governor of Romanian Central Bank, has recently appreciated that the lack of 
banking union and fiscal union somewhat embrittled the monetary union and imposed a high cost of debt financing 
because of market perception, noting an important paradigm shift on the line to ensure the continuity of critical 
financial services through a combination of preventive actions with corrective solutions. He believes that banking 
regulations, although they have a more pronounced macroprudential orientation, are not sufficient to prevent the 
accumulation of systemic vulnerabilities, other components of the mix of macroeconomic policies should avoid the 
generation of large variations in the demand for loans, especially by promoting an anti-cyclical revenue policy in 
order to prevent excessive growth of credit demand over the medium-term repayment capacity of borrowers that 
may withstand high pressures when the economy adjusts. Since mortgage loans and derivative operations have 
boosted moral hazard in the banking sector, banks should finance mainly the most dynamic sectors and leading to 
economic growth, so it would be desirable to review the policies of commercial banks to finance the productive 
activities, generating not only added value, but also a sustainable income. 
  
Daniel Dăianu (2013), First Deputy Chairman of the Financial Supervision Authority, notes the impact of 
financial integration progress, the complexity and risks of financial operations/innovations, including the failure of 
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regulatory and supervisory systems, the shortcomings of corporate governance, the market manipulation and the 
pursuit of high profits associated with high risks rapidly propagated in the system. Dăianu also combats the great 
illusion that price stability (low inflation) would ensure financial stability based on the assumption of efficient 
markets. Clear progress towards the legislative building and especially to institutional one, coupled with macro and 
microprudential policies, improvement of European and global governance are positive factors, but many other 
requirements are emerging, such as unsolved structural issues linked to bank size and separation of their activities 
and the need for a new Basel agreement (IV), adaptation of regulation and supervision to the specificity of electronic 
transactions, to the complexity and the strong integration of markets, to the proliferation and dissemination of 
risks. Dăianu remarked that the transformation of depositors into investors through restructuring/resolution changes 
the game rules affecting bank liquidity situation at a time when liquidity trap occurs and may lead to large capital 
migrations outside banking sector or outside the EU. 
 Florin Georgescu (2013), First Deputy Governor of Romanian Central Bank, focuses on macroprudential 
regulation to prevent systemic vulnerabilities including actions targeting to cycle amplitude of financial risk which 
means a counter-cyclical role of this policy. Macroeconomic policy mix must avoid the excessive growth of credit 
demand over the flow of domestic savings and hence fiscal policy and income policy in a country should play an 
active role in limiting the growth of credit demand and also in preventing assets price overvaluation. The issue of 
banking union enrolls in the new framework of EU economic governance together with fiscal disciplinary measures 
by means of the Fiscal Compact and Scoreboard Indicators (with the 11 indicators) and by a possible fiscal 
union. He highlights the merits of the Basel agreements on strengthening the resilience of the banking system to 
shocks and believes that it was created to a large extent an appropriate institutional and legislative framework for 
banking union through the new tasks of the ECB, the existence and activities of the European Banking Authority 
and the European Commission's recent proposals on the Single Resolution Mechanism and state aid rules for the 
banks in crisis, as well as the Directives BRR and DGS. 
  Michel Barnier (2012), European Commissioner for Internal Market and Services, regards as necessary the 
insurance of financial markets stability and efficiency, restoring the people trust on them, strongly supporting the 
real economy by the financial sector. He emphasizes the important role of the Single Supervision Mechanism which 
is going to to become fully operational in 12 months after the entry into force of SSM Regulation, probably during 
the summer of 2014. The new rules on bank own funds and liquidity are essential to prevent banking crises, but it is 
important the activity of supervision and prevention of a possible crisis. Resolution measures must have a preventive 
character and internal recapitalization of bank by shareholders and creditors takes the leading role, each state will 
have a national fund that complements the European funds. Ultimate responsibility of bank resolution and funding it 
is still a subject of dispute between the European and national decision makers. 
 For Daniel Gros (2013), Director of CEPS, the achievement of banking union is the means to break the vicious 
link between banks and sovereign states, the Single Supervision Mechanism (SSM), designed to prevent the 
systemic risks, must be accompanied by a Single Resolution Mechanism(SRM). Banks should be weaned from 
investing in government bonds because sovereign debts can no longer be considered risk free. Risk of sovereign 
debt should not be set according to the ratings but it should be connected to fiscal/budget deficit and public debt 
level, and to the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure, administered by the European Commission under the 
European Semester. In 2012, in the major EU countries, banks had a huge debt exposure on sovereign debt (over 
100%) and it would be desirable that under the provisions of Large Exposure Directive banks should not hold 
government bonds over 25% of their own capital and much of the sovereign debt to be held by 
individuals (households) and/or investment funds. In Cyprus case Daniel Gros considered that foreign depositors, 
much of them being Russian oligarchs, were in search of high yields and they should bear a large part of the losses. 
  Douglas J. Elliott (2012), from the Brookings Institution, believes that the best solution would be to strengthen 
the role of the European Banking Authority (EBA), setting up of a new bank resolution authority, proposed by the 
European Commission, the establishment of risk premiums to cover bank losses, avoiding tensions with Great 
Britain. The motivations for building banking union are quite consistent: counteracting the weaknesses of banking 
system and reducing systemic risk for banks that may potentiate the euro crisis, restoration of the ECB's monetary 
policy effectiveness, further integration of the European banking system and completion of the single banking 
market. Banking union must be accompanied by a fiscal union to prevent moral hazard and to break the vicious 
circle created between banks and governments by public debt. Elliot raises the question of macroprudential policies 
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distinct of microprudential policies, the first are operating in the entire financial system, the latest at the level of 
banking actors. The three components of banking union-supervision, resolution and deposit guarantee-are closely 
related and therefore the process should not take too long time. 
 Bernhard Speyer (2013) of the research department of Deutsche Bank believes that there is an obvious progress 
towards banking union but challenges remain on line to building the institutional framework. Before starting the 
Single Supervision Mechanism it is expected  to perform stress tests by EBA but it would be more needed the 
implementation of Balance Sheet Assesment (BSA) than the stress tests. Speyer sees the need to change or improve 
the provisions of the Treaty (TFEU) besides the adoption of the necessary directives. There are overlaps of 
competences between European level and national level, and some reluctances on cession of sovereignty and on 
decision centralization at the EU level. There are serious financial constraints on the establishment of joint European 
resolution and deposit guarantee funds. 
 
Conclusions 
 
1)    Creating banking union became necessary to break the vicious circle between governments and banks to 
restrain or eliminate the risks of corporate governance deficiencies and systemic risks, to combine macroprudential 
policies with microprudential policies, to appreciably diminish the moral hazard and ensure the EU financial 
stability; 
2)   The complexity of financial integration, of financial operations and innovation requires not only structural 
measures in the banking system but also legislative, institutional, policy and governance changes (at all 
levels). There are opinions that the mix of macroeconomic policies should aim at the cyclic character of loans 
demand, ensuring its sustainable level, and banks must shift from mortgage and derivative operations towards 
dynamic economic sectors and effective productive activities; 
3)    Large exposure of banks to sovereign debt has created evident vulnerabilities, therefore investments in 
government bonds must be limited to a percentage of up to 25% of their own capital, the main investors will be 
individuals (households) and/or investment funds, as in the U.S.; 
4)    Despite the skepticism of economic observers the progress towards banking union building was spectacular 
and quite fast, European institutions have acted coordinated and effectively, according to the tasks they have. 
Besides redefining functions/activities of the European Banking Authority, it was established Supervisory Board 
(CSB) which functions within the ECB, there have recently been made proposals of the European Commission for a 
Single Resolution Mechanism and state aid rules for eligible banks being in crisis, including directives BRR and 
DGS;   
5)    Banking Union with the three components-surveillance, resolution and deposit guarantee- at the European 
level, did not start from scratch, it was preceded by the creation of a European System of Financial Supervision, 
consisting of the European Systemic Risk Board and the 3 European authorities (banking, insurance and pensions, 
capital markets), as well as by transposing of the content of Basel agreements into directives.That is why it was 
easier to move quickly on banking supervision component, because the other two components require the 
establishment of common European funds difficult to constitute under the present financial circumstances; 
6)    Banking Resolution requires not only a pool but instead a fundamental change of actors role towards 
transforming the depositors/creditors into investors that together with the shareholders will bear the costs of 
restructuring/resolution, which may seriously affect the banks liquidity situation and lead to high bank capital 
migrations outside the sector or outside the EU; 
7)    Strong interdependence of the three components of the banking union requires the urgency of   completing 
the banking union within a reasonable period of time (three years) and probably a change of treaties after 
Euroelections  from  2014, specifically requested by UK, but also embraced by other states, in order to clarify 
several legal, institutional, organizational, political aspects, including a possible fiscal union and a political union 
under federal form. 
8)    There is the opinion of many European officials that the banking union must be complemented quickly by a 
close fiscal union characterized through the establishment of a European strong  budget,  launch of Eurobonds, 
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creating a consolidated coordination mechanism of national budgets, achieving of remanent and completely 
independent national budgets, harmonization of direct taxation and approach of indirect taxation levels. 
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